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The Croatian Diaspora in North America:
Identity, Ethnic Solidarity and the Formation of a 
“Transnational National Community”
I V A N A  D U R I C
I N T R O D U C T I O N
ͳis article presents the results of an empirical study examining the impact of 
democratization, ethnic tensions and the conflict situation in Croatia on the 
self-perception, ethnic homogenization, and the process by which a “transna-
tional national community” developed among the Croatian diaspora in North 
America. ͳe main methodology used in this research is a discourse analysis 
of articles published in the Fraternalist during the period -. ͳe Fra-
ternalist is the official journal of the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), the most 
influential Croatian diasporic organization in North America. For the purpose 
of this study, only articles describing the activities and attitudes of members of 
the Croatian diaspora toward their homeland were taken into consideration. 
Loring M. Danforth defines a diaspora as a social entity that “...consists of 
people who left their homeland either voluntarily or by force, and who have an 
awareness of constituting a minority immigrant community in the host country 
in which they have settled.” According to Robin Cohen, the main feature that 
distinguishes diasporic from other kinds of immigrant communities is a strong 
emphasis on group identity and a refusal to totally assimilate into the host soci-
ety. Members of the group are stretched between two countries and two loyal-
ties. ͳis is particularly the case with first generation immigrants for whom the 
native country is the main point of their collective thoughts and efforts. More-
over, diasporic communities tend to feel an obligation to influence the home 
society by all possible means. Greece, Ireland, and Israel serve as illustrative 
examples of the impact that diasporic communities can have on the process of 
struggle for a separate nation-state. In those cases, nation-state formation was 
supported by large, well-organized diasporic communities, which have exer-
cised a “long tradition of active participation in the nationalist struggles of their 
homelands.” 
 spaces of identity /
Diasporic organizations and newspapers can play an important role in rais-
ing a distinctly ethnic consciousness. Benedict Anderson has examined the role 
of the press in enabling and strengthening feelings of ethnic consciousness and 
in the success of diasporic communities in preserving their distinctiveness.5 In 
this paper, the Croatian diaspora in North America is considered as a commu-
nity of immigrants acting within their host countries to influence affairs back 
home. Despite the fact its members are scattered all over the United States and 
Canada, the Croatian diaspora managed to strengthen an ethnic consciousness 
and solidarity that reached its peak at the beginning of the war in Croatia in 
 (though one could also argue that the conflict served to foster the diaspo-
ra’s ethnic feelings). Finally, special attention should be paid to the role of mod-
ern communication in this process since it enabled the diaspora to respond rap-
idly and to initiate a variety of activities (political and humanitarian) directed at 
both the host and home societies. Moreover, new means of communication fa-
cilitated the emergence of a so-called “transnational national community” that 
is understood, according to Danforth, to mean “national communities… being 
constructed on a transnational scale.”
ͳe importance of the North American Croatian diasporic community lies 
primarily in its size, which has been approximated at from one to . million 
(the population of Croatia in the  census was about . million).7 Together 
with a long tradition of organizing, the North American Croatian diasporic 
community is also characterized by its concern, interest, and participation in 
Croatian politics. Although a variety of Croatian organizations are active in 
North America, the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU) is the oldest and largest. 
Boasting around , members, this union is one of the most influential of 
the Croatian diasporic organizations. ͳe CFU enjoys a certain influence on lo-
cal authorities and is therefore widely accepted as a legitimate representative of 
the Croatian ethnic community in the U.S. and Canada. ͳe official tools with 
which the CFU helps to influence or even create the community’s public opin-
ion are the weekly Fraternalist and the radio station, Voice of the CFU. 
ͳe Fraternalist has been published since , and currently enjoys a read-
ership of around ,.8 Due to its “middle of the road” editorial policy, the 
Fraternalist was available in Croatia even during the Communist period, thus 
providing an informational exchange between the diaspora and the homeland. 
At the same time, the majority of other émigré publications, particularly those 
with certain political agendas and tendencies against the Yugoslav regime, were 
forbidden.
ͳe period from  to  has been chosen in order to trace the process 
of political development and raising an ethnic and political consciousness, 
which was followed by the wide mobilization of the Croatian diasporic commu-
nity. Accordingly, the research findings can be divided into two main periods. 
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ͳe first lasts from the death of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito in May  
until - and covers the weakening of the Yugoslav Communist regime and 
the beginning of the process of democratization. ͳe second covers the first 
democratic elections in May , the proclamation of Croatia’s independence 
in , as well as the period of war.
T H E  E N F O R C E M E N T  O F  E T H N I C  I D E N T I T Y  A N D  T H E  
M O B I L I Z A T I O N  O F  T H E  N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  C R O A T I A N  
D I A S P O R A
Among articles published in the Fraternalist during the period from  to 
, a special place is given to those devoted to the strengthening of ethnic 
identity in its readership. A number of articles deal with Croatian history, often 
glorifying the memory of famous Croatian politicians such as Stjepan Radić and 
Ante Starčević, the founding fathers of Croatian national politics in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.  Culture is another popular topic, with numer-
ous portraits of Croatian writers, priests and other famous personalities (for ex-
ample, Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, Countess Katarina Zrinska, etc.) that nour-
ish ethnic pride. Religion was rather neglected in the Fraternalist’s writings un-
til the first shy obituaries appeared in the early s, stressing the religious 
affiliation of the deceased, something previously not mentioned. Later, the Fra-
ternalist published messages from the Croatian Catholic clergy addressed to 
the diaspora as well as publicizing their visits. All the elements of ethnic iden-
tity in Anthony D. Smith’s terms can be found in the Fraternalist's discourse 
between  and . Culture, history, myths, language and religion were in-
strumentalized in the process of ethnic homogenization and served as the first 
stage of diasporic political mobilization. ͳe Yugoslav (Croatian) language dis-
pute in the second half of the s over renaming the official Croatian lan-
guage “Croato-Serbian” occurred at a focal point of the diasporic community’s 
collective strivings. Failure to preserve a distinctive name for the language in-
stigated collective distress among the Croatian diaspora and led to an outbreak 
of recollections of other historical injustices, especially those during the twenti-
eth century. In addition, the reinterpretation of national history, particularly of 
the Bleiburg victims, of demographic losses during World War II,12 of the Cro-
atian Spring and of the campaign for the placement of the Ban Josip Jelačić’s 
monument,  served as powerfully motivating symbols that set in motion the 
process of ethnic homogenization and mobilization.
Language
ͳe mobilization of the Croatian diasporic community for the U.S. census in 
 can be identified as one of the first steps in the process of the diaspora’s 
homogenization. A campaign was organized in the Fraternalist, advising every 
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American citizen of Croatian origin to declare him/herself a Croat, and his/her 
mother tongue Croatian. ͳe census was expected to reflect the size of the 
community and, in turn, define the level of financial support that each group 
would receive from the U.S. government. 
However, these statistics did not reflect diasporic reality. ͳe disuse into 
which the Croatian language had fallen among Croatian Americans was noted 
at the autumn session of the CFU in , as well as the lack of qualified teach-
ers and the danger that the Croatian language might disappear among the dia-
sporic community within next  years. At the same meeting, English was de-
clared the official language of the CFU (few readers were able to read in Cro-
atian). By the early s, the process of the Croatian diaspora’s losing their 
native language was entering its final phase. Quite unexpectedly, political de-
velopments in Croatia inaugurated efforts among the Croatian diaspora to pro-
tect and promote the Croatian language. ͳe promotion of Croatian among the 
diasporic community took two main forms in the second half of the s. One 
focused on the “old homeland” – and protested attempts to change the official 
title of the Croatian language in the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia. As expressed in one letter: 
Apparently, there is a movement in Yugoslavia to have the name "hrvatski knjizevni 
jezik" (Croatian literary language) deleted from the Constitution of the Republic of 
Croatia. If Croatian people exist, the Croatian Socialist Republic exists, and we can 
certainly say that the Croatian literary language exists and should continue to exist. If 
we allow [it]... then we are being denied our very existence as a people. If we want to 
continue to exist as a Croatian people and maintain our ethnic identity, for which we 
strive here and in the homeland, then we as Croatians in emigration and in Croatia 
should not be denied the name of our language which makes us distinct from any other 
people in the world...
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Reacting to this threat, the Croatian diaspora started a fund-raising campaign 
to establish the first Department of Croatian Language and Culture outside of 
Croatia, at York University in Toronto, Canada. Despite the diaspora’s public 
appeals and lobbying, the official name of the Croatian language was changed 
to Croato-Serbian in . 
ͳe second way Croatian was promoted was to reverse the under-represen-
tation of the Croatian language and personnel in the Serbo-Croatian section of 
the Voice of America (VOA) radio station. ͳe CFU initially requested that af-
firmative action be introduced at the VOA and then demanded the creation of 
a separate Croatian section. ͳe claim was made on the grounds that:
…the VOA carries an important message of democracy and serves as an indispensable 
source of alternate information in Yugoslavia's still relatively closed society. … By retai-
ning a combined "Serbo-Croatian" section, the VOA is missing an opportunity to reach 
and establish rapport and credibility with Croatian speakers.19
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Underlying the distinctiveness of the Croatian language, yet another letter 
stressed that:
Suppression of the Croatian language in official American broadcasts not only offends 
the approximately  million Croatian-speaking listeners of Yugoslavia's population of  
million, but it is also a barrier that keeps Croatian listeners away.
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ͳe VOA’s separate Croatian section was created in  and “broadcast five () 
 minute live air-shows daily“21 while its personnel was enlarged from two to 
five members in the first half of .22 
Religion
Freedom of religious expression was another important issue in the process of 
ethnically mobilizing the Croatian diaspora in North America. During the So-
cialist period in Yugoslavia (-), religion was rather oppressed as Yu-
goslav religious diversity posed a threat to the Communist ideology of broth-
erhood and unity. In line with its espoused neutral position, the Fraternalist 
avoided emphasizing religious affiliation. It was not until the mid-s that an 
accent on religion could be found in the Fraternalist’s articles. Religion was al-
ways more present and preserved among Croatian diasporic communities than 
in the home country because the Catholic Church took upon itself the role 
of custodian and set out to preserve a distinct Croatian ethnic identity, lan-
guage and tradition among Croatian diasporic communities. As George J. 
Prpic stresses, it was “the Catholic churches that became the first centers of 
Croatian life.”24 Moreover, due to the intolerant attitudes of Yugoslav authorities 
toward political émigrés, it was only the Church that secured the right to keep 
close relations and regular contacts with the Croatian diaspora without being 
punished for their activity. On the way toward ethnic consolidation, an impor-
tant step was the publication of the annual “Encyclical to the Diaspora” in the 
Fraternalist in December . Directed at the diaspora, it stressed the unity 
of the Croats in the homeland and the diaspora under the framework of the na-
tional Catholic Church.
After having met the need for national spiritual regeneration, focus shifted 
to the need for material renewal, and the reconstruction of churches became 
an important issue. After , frequent calls for financial assistance to restore 
churches appeared in the Fraternalist, such as requests for the church in Sošice 
and the parish of St. Joseph in Zagreb.
Culture, history and myths
As mentioned earlier, many articles in the Fraternalist recall the great tradition 
of Croatian national culture. Besides educational motives, these writings func-
tioned to consolidate ethnic identity; they were a preparatory stage for ethnic 
homogenization. As one of the readers, Fr. Paul Maslach, stated: 
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I am impressed by the many articles on history and culture. You are using history and 
culture as a learning tool: looking to the past and learning from it to bring about a bet-
ter and more prosperous future, I certainly support your efforts… 
Already at the th convention of the CFU, which was held in September , 
“the decision to cooperate with the Old Homeland was reached for the purpose 
of affirming and learning about the Croatian cultural tradition.” In addition to 
intensifying the sphere of external cultural cooperation, i.e. with the home so-
ciety, the CFU turned toward strengthening internal collaboration, among the 
different organizations of the North American Croatian diaspora. In , the 
Croatian alumnae network – the AMAC (Almae Matris Alumni Croatiacae) 
– merged with the CFU. In an open letter published in the Fraternalist, the 
AMAC invited all its members to join ranks with the CFU under the pretext of 
“broad Croatian cultural action in North America.”31 ͳe letter evoked similar 
earlier attempts that had failed, stressing that:
By setting our goals in a realistic and reasonable way, by uniting in purpose and by 
respecting individuality in style and form, we can build a foundation for meaningful 
Croatian efforts in North America.32
Among the main goals set is for mutual participation in activities, “dissemina-
tion of unbiased information about Croats and Croatia” while the Fraternalist 
becomes “an open common forum for exchange of information, views and ideas 
of all AMAC/CFU members.”33
 ͳe extension and solidifying of relations was not only directed at the cul-
tural sphere but also toward reconciliation of the different political ideologies 
among the Croatian diaspora in North America. ͳis relates particularly to the 
openings of the CFU’s new lodges in Canada, where the largest percentage of 
post-World War II immigrants (the “newcomers”) had settled. For many rea-
sons this large segment of the Croatian diaspora had not joined the CFU. When 
the political situation in Croatia changed, however, and the appearance of eth-
nic homogeneity became desirable, it became necessary to reconcile and incor-
porate the opposing ideological streams among the Croatian diaspora. As a re-
sult, recollections of World War II disputes and debates began to appear in the 
s, challenging and reinterpreting what was prescribed as official Croatian 
history. 
Back in the home society, amidst economic crises and galloping inflation 
that by  had reached , Serbian nationalism expanded under the cover 
of democratization, as well as claims that “Croatia’s Communists were com-
mitting ‘cultural genocide’ against the Serb community,” recalling the atroci-
ties committed during World War II. ͳese accusations opened a space for old 
and unsettled disputes on the number and nationality of persons murdered in 
Jasenovac to be rehashed. Publication of Tomislav Sabljak’s book Croatia and 
the Victims of World War II furthered this public discussion. ͳe Fraternalist’s 
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response was to publish an article on the war victims, followed by an apology 
from the editors for raising the question and a promise not to do so again: 
...Because CFU by-laws rule against instigating religious controversy and because we 
have many Serbian members enrolled in our society, it is only with the greatest reluc-
tance that we have become involved in the controversy over the alleged massacres du-
ring World War II in the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia… We are printing 
Brother Beljo's story in response to those who would attempt to blame the Croatian 
people for the alleged murder of , to ,, Serbians. We consider this our 
final word on this subject and do not intend to open the pages of the Fraternalist to any 
further discussion on the matter. 
However, the discussion was just beginning and was to be recalled on many 
other occasions. Reopening the debate on war atrocities in  met with ap-
proval among one part of the Fraternalist’s readership, who responded empha-
sizing that “Croatians have been scapegoats for too long.” Yet, it took several 
years for a final condemnation of all crimes to be issued, of those committed 
by Yugoslav partisans after World War II as well as those of the Ustashi regime 
during it. Significantly, on the th anniversary of the Bleiburg events, it was the 
Croatian Catholic Church who issued an indictment of all the atrocities thus 
performing the role of mediator and conciliator. 
ͳe year  brought about a change in the Fraternalist’s official discourse 
toward Croatia. Instead of its usual “middle of the road policy,” a discussion be-
gan on the historical events of World War II in order to bridge gaps within the 
Croatian nation. Certainly, the debate appeared as a reaction to nationalistic 
Serbian claims and Serbian xenophobic roll-calls hinting at collective Croatian 
guilt for the atrocities of the Ustashi regime during World War II. ͳe first step 
toward an all-Croatian reconciliation was the redefinition of recent history. A 
letter from Lucian Reichherzer reflects this aim; it is quite controversial in the 
way he denies the similarity between the Fascist and Nazi movements, claim-
ing that the Ustashi “just wanted a sovereign Croatia.” In immediate response 
to this viewpoint appeared the complaint of John Strizic, who protested against 
the CFU’s nationalistic and linguistic propaganda, expressing regrets at much 
of what was being published. He stressed that: 
Our membership is predominantly American and Canadian born and educated. To 
them, the Old Home's linguistic and national exclusiveness are the ninth hole in the 
flute… Only a small number are interested in the homeland of their ancestors… Under 
the coverage of history and language, some of the newcomers are distorting our lines. 
Moreover, Strizic reflects negatively upon attempts to misuse the CFU for na-
tionalistic politics (as Reichherzer did in his letter) and the extremist émigré's 
dreams to return to power in Croatia. 
Responding to this letter, Ante Beljo thanks Strizic for his remark that the 
younger generation of migrants is going in the same direction as the extremists 
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– “a Croatian direction, the direction of our future and [I] hope that all of us 
will realize it... ͳat is the only direction for a better future of Croatia and of the 
CFU...” Beljo condemns those who preach the solution according to which the 
best is when one group rules Croatia, while the opposition is exiled to a wood, 
prison or to emigration, concluding that everyone should be equal and equally 
interested in Croatia’s welfare.42 
An initiative presented to U.S. Congress to erect a monument to Draža 
Mihailović, a Serbian Chetnick leader during World War II, served to pour oil 
on the already flaming debate.  ͳe CFU immediately responded by sending an 
open letter to Congress, strongly opposing the idea and condemning:
…any attempt to glorify or to erect a monument honoring the dreaded Nazi collabora-
tor… The CFU will always decry acts of terrorism and/or atrocities be they by Croati-
ans, Serbians or by Nazi collaborators against the forces of decency.
ͳe Fraternalist invited all members to contact their representatives in Con-
gress and complain. ͳe protest was then extended to the targeting for public 
attack of the Rev. Djuic, a Chetnick war criminal still alive and residing in the 
U.S. Although the campaign lasted for several months, it was not as successful 
as previous ones had been. Unlike Andrija Artuković, a Ustashi member and 
minister during the NDH (Independent Croatian State) who was extradited to 
Yugoslavia and indicted, Rev. Djuic died peacefully in his American home. Cer-
tainly, the outcome left a rather biased impression, creating feelings of discon-
tent among the Croatian diaspora, as did anti-Chetnick articles, which not 
only reflected the defensive position of the diaspora but also helped to reaffirm 
assertions that Croatians were scapegoats. Once again, traumatic memories and 
history worked towards creating intra-ethnic homogeneity while at the same 
time widening the interethnic gap. 
T H E  D I A S P O R A ’ S  P O L I T I C A L  E N G A G E M E N T
Until the beginning of the s, an interest in American domestic affairs pre-
vailed among the Fraternalist’s readership. However, an interest in develop-
ments in Croatia was never absent. During the first half of the s, there 
were articles reprinted occasionally from the Croatian newspapers Vjesnik and 
Večernji list. Until , most of these reprinted articles were related to the liv-
ing conditions in Croatian villages in Dalmatia, Lika and Gorski kotar – where 
the majority of Croatian Americans came from. After , however, articles on 
the openings of new waterworks or asphalt roads in far-away villages were re-
placed by reprints from Croatian and American newspapers devoted to the po-
litical developments in Yugoslavia. ͳis change in the content of the Frater-
nalist was initiated primarily by the wider process of democratization and the 
disintegration of the Eastern European Communist block. At the same time, 
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economic crises and galloping nationalism sharpened the political situation in 
Socialist Yugoslavia. ͳe CFU’s readership was well aware of what was going 
on in Yugoslav (Croatian) politics. Reports on the Yugoslav Communist leaders’ 
meetings, conferences, news and analyses of the situation in Kosovo and the 
abolition of its autonomy in  often appeared in the Fraternalist. 
Prior to the final dissolution of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the demo-
cratic processes in Croatia, the Croatian diaspora was very much in favor of se-
cession from Yugoslavia. ͳis kind of feeling is best expressed in a  letter to 
the editor by N. Bilandzich: 
...Those elements in Yugoslavia which are at present in control must understand that the 
Croatian people will never give up their rights to liberty, justice and self-determination. 
We want freedom and independence, and for this we do not owe an apology to anyone. 
In today’s Croatia, foreign elements can sing and hoist their flags, but if the Croatian 
people do the same, they are declared an enemy of the state and placed in jail. Mr. Edi-
tor, we Croatians are slaves in our own homeland. If you examine our historical past, 
I am sure that you will be able to conclude that we Croatians have done so much to ad-
vance the cause of Slavism and Yugoslavism, which has brought us nothing more than 
oppression and misery. For this reason, I am and always will be for Croatian indepen-
dence and liberty. 
As already cited, a similar opinion is expressed in another letter which under-
lines that “a nation without its independence is like a homeless person living in 
someone else’s home as a servant or slave.”
At the end of the s, the Fraternalist very carefully followed the develop-
ments in Croatia towards democratization and a market-oriented economy as 
well as the introduction of pluralism and a multi-party system. ͳe Fraternal-
ist paid particularly close attention to the efforts made to found new political 
parties. Among the earliest attempts closely followed by the Fraternalist is the 
case of the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) under the leadership of Franjo 
Tudjman. ͳe CDU is described in the Fraternalist as the most widespread and 
the best known opposition party in Croatia and among the Croatian diaspora. 
ͳe success of its efforts to “attract money and expertise from Croats living 
abroad...” also receives mention. ͳe Fraternalist found it necessary to respond 
immediately to allegations of having made a financial contribution to the CDU: 
The Society cannot and will not endorse any political party. We don’t even do this in 
the United States or Canada because our members are free to select their own political 
party… We do recommend candidates who are members of the Society, but that is as 
far as we will go in becoming involved in political parties; ... we disclaim all those ru-
mors being circulated that the Croatian Fraternal Union is financially contributing to 
any political party in Croatia.
ͳe first multi-party elections since World War II were scheduled for April  
(the first round) and May ,  (the second round). ͳe diaspora was pleased 
by a letter from the CDU to the Croatian Assembly requiring voting privileges 
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for “gastarbeiters” and Croatian emigrants (those that were still citizens of the 
Socialist Republic of Croatia), and freedom for political emigrants to return. 
However, participation in the elections was approved only for those with per-
manent resident status in Croatia, under the condition that they had to come to 
Croatia and vote in the country. In spite of Communist reluctance to allow the 
diaspora to vote, the CDU won the elections, taking  of the seats while the 
overall turnout was .  
ͷe Diaspora’s main activities during the war in Croatia
ͳe political events surrounding Croatia’s declaration of independence and the 
eruption of war in the autumn of  caused a rapid mobilization of the Croa-
tian diaspora. A protest rally against the disarmament of the Croatian police 
forces, held in Toronto on January , , brought together , Croatians 
and other supporters. Soon afterward, the CFU openly proclaimed: “…in this 
time of great danger we must stand together.” 
ͳe events in Croatia had a direct impact on the Croatian diasporic com-
munity in North America in proving “that they [members of the diaspora] are 
an organic part of their nation, the most directly connected with its destiny, al-
though far away from Croatia.” Access to technological advancements allowed 
many Croatians in North America to stay in daily contact with their relatives in 
Croatia. ͳeir feelings about affairs in Croatia are best revealed in CFU Presi-
dent Bernard Luketich’s statement: 
I think all of the people who consider themselves descendants of the Croatian heritage 
are very concerned and interested in what is taking place in the homeland of our 
parents, grandparents and relatives. 
With the Croatian diaspora’s political agitation and their financial and material 
assistance to the newly created Croatian army and communities and towns 
that were under attack, the community appeared more strongly united than 
ever. 
Responding to an official appeal from the Croatian Government, numer-
ous written petitions and telephone campaigns to the White House and the 
U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee were initiated, expressing dissatisfaction with 
the level of American support for the new Croatian democracy. Although U.S. 
authorities recognized Croatia’s independence in the beginning of , and 
assisted in the deployment of UN troops, the largest problem for Croatia re-
mained the arms embargo. In , the Croatian diasporic community called 
for a “united Croatian front,” recognizing the importance of creating a Croatian 
lobby, which was later accomplished through the foundation of NFCA (the Na-
tional Federation of Croatian Americans) on January , . 
spaces of identity /
Humanitarian Aid 
CFU responded instantly to the news of fighting and refugees in Croatia. A 
campaign was launched to collect donations, “...to help our sisters and brothers 
suffering from the consequences of terrorist attacks in Our Homeland.” In 
early August, the “Croatian Humanitarian Aid Fund” was established. By the 
beginning of September , the fund had already collected , US, while 
donations had reached , US by the end of June . By July , , 
 containers of humanitarian relief had been sent to Croatia. In addition, an-
other fund, "Hrvatska akcija za život" (Croatian Action for Life), was launched 
in the Fraternalist in April , the main aim of which was to accumulate do-
nations for children who had lost fathers in the war.
ͳe outburst of hostilities together with the ensuing humanitarian activi-
ties marked the final stage in the process of the “transnational homogenization” 
of Croatians. As Daniele Conversi points out, it was the “international danger 
[that] strengthened national unity” among both parts of the Croatian ethnic 
community – within Croatia and abroad.
M E D I A ,  G L O B A L I Z A T I O N  A N D  D I A S P O R A
ͳe diasporic community’s involvement in the political problems in Croatia was 
a result of processes of globalization which allow for an extension of national 
communities through the emergence of “transnational national communities” 
(Danforth ). Loring M. Danforth stresses the importance of homelands for 
diasporic communities “... in shaping their sense of collective identity. People 
of the Diaspora continue to be members of the nations whose homelands they 
have left behind” (). Among the most important predispositions for diasporic 
participation is a new democratic experience that motivates the diaspora to 
lobby on behalf of the homeland. If the group has a high level of education and 
prosperity, this, of course, helps. Often, academic “networks” are established in 
order to promote and actively participate in both the host and home society’s 
activities (Danforth ).
Still, the crucial issue turns out to be modern communication technologies. 
Danforth identifies the influence of new communication technologies and im-
proved transportation that enable the diaspora to participate to a much greater 
extent in the politics of the homeland. He stresses that new technologies, sat-
ellite telecommunications networks, e-mail, and faxes allow constant contact 
with the home-country and instant response, while the speed of inter-continen-
tal air travel enables people to be involved in the life of two or more countries 
simultaneously: 
The ‘primordial sentiments’ of region, ethnicity, language and religion globalize (Appa-
durai ), spreading throughout the world to unite vast networks of people who re-
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main loyal to a national homeland they no longer inhabit. National communities are 
not being replaced by transnational ones, they are being constructed on a transnational 
scale. (Danforth ). 
ͳe mobilization of and political pressure exercised by the Croatian diaspora 
as well as their numerous efforts to collect humanitarian aid immediately after 
war broke out in Croatia confirm his theory.
According to Danforth, newspapers are a traditional source of information 
that keep people “informed of political developments in their homeland through 
ethnic media, which often reproduce material directly from sources in the na-
tional capital” (-). However, the speed of this information has proven un-
satisfactory, encouraging the introduction of new computer-based information 
exchange systems such as the Croatian Electronic Network (founded in ): 
“ͳese computer links have provided an organized news distribution service 
which has proven invaluable to us here in North America during the war for 
obtaining the latest information.” 
Since May , one hour Croatian radio news broadcasts have been trans-
mitted daily throughout North America. ͳe radio broadcasts (in English, 
German and French) were among the earliest means which had “...a significant 
impact on creating the true image of Croatia. Our people were informed so 
they could inform, in their turn, their friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens.” 
In addition, in January , a special satellite Croatian TV program for North 
America was introduced (central TV news broadcasting one hour per day). Al-
most at the same time, beginning on February , , an agreement was es-
tablished with SPAN cable TV to transmit the main daily news. 
ͳe Croatian government recognized the importance of developing modern 
communication means for disseminating information and interacting with dia-
sporic communities early on. It counted on the political support of the diaspora 
as well as recognizing that the diaspora were significant financial contributors 
to the new Croatian state.68
C H A N G E S  I N  T H E  C F U ’ S  A T T I T U D E S  T O W A R D  C R O A T I A N  
P O L I T I C S
ͳe war situation in Croatia produced a high level of ethnic homogenization 
and solidarity among the diaspora and engaged all possible means of influence, 
whether financial or political. Logically it was to be expected that sooner or 
later this homogeneity and unity would be exhausted or begin to decline. One 
of the first riffs was of a rather benign nature and related to a campaign to re-
name streets. A street in the Croatian capital Zagreb named after Josip Maroh-
nic, a founding father and the first president of the Croatian Fraternal Union, 
was renamed, which surprised CFU membership and led to discord. After much 
protest, Marohnic's name was given to another street.
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Another set of misunderstandings resulted from financial matters. ͳe CFU 
had been very generous in its assistance to Croatia during the war, promoting 
unity among all Croats in the face of war. But the CFU’s members became frus-
trated due to the large number of appeals coming from Croatia for their finan-
cial assistance. A letter from CFU member, M. Popp, reveals this concern: “Now 
there are several groups and organizations coming around with their hands out. 
Many of us are dubious about their cause and wonder if these moneys are just 
going into their pockets.” Similarly, the CFU president became irritated by the 
variety of demands of CFU non-members:
…who feel that the individual project which they are working with is the most impor-
tant item of concern for our Croatian people. … Every day we receive some request for 
financial assistance from non-members of the organization who feel that just because 
they are Croatians and have worthy projects, our society should financially support 
their requests. Again we remind all, the Croatian Fraternal Union‘s prime concern is to 
financially support members of the Croatian Fraternal Union.
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In addition, it seems that one more reason for CFU dissatisfaction was their low 
profile in Croatia: the CFU was rarely mentioned in Croatian public discourse 
despite its generous help. A reprint from Večernji list surmises the reason lies 
in the CFU’s reluctance to get involved “in local Croatian political trickery.” 71
C O N C L U D I N G  S T A T E M E N T
In the period from  to , the Croatian Fraternal Union was transformed 
from a politically passive and rather neutral organization into one that took a 
more active role articulating the political adherence of North American Croa-
tians and their support for political changes in the home society of Croatia. 
Across the Fraternalist’s pages, there was a constant flurry of activity intended 
to solidify the diaspora’s ethnic identity. Moreover, it could be argued that the 
process of ethnic homogenization was set off by Croatian independence and the 
eruption of war in the summer  of . ͳe CFU became actively involved in 
the democratic process through the wide political mobilization of its members. 
ͳese activities included protests organized in Washington in  against the 
abolition of the Croatian language’s official status in socialist Croatia, and those 
in  encouraging U.S. foreign policy to put a stop to the war in Croatia.
During the s and until the beginning of the war, there was a definite 
strengthening in the ethnic identity of members of the Croatian Fraternal 
Union. Issues central to this process are the self-identification that began with 
the  U.S. census campaign, and language, a strong emphasis on religion and 
common culture through the continuous publication of articles on Croatia’s he-
roic history, its national heroes, ideologists, priests, writers and poets, which 
served to revive common memories, a sense of unity and of ethnic identity. It 
seems that the diaspora’s organ served as a useful link in the mobilization of the 
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Croatian national movement, in keeping with Benedict Anderson’s argument 
that the periodical press is of crucial importance in the emergence of national 
communities. In a sense the diasporic press provides not only news from both 
the host and home countries, but it also constantly reproduces elements of 
group identity among immigrants. In line with this argument, it should be also 
noted that besides ethnic mobilization and solidarity, extensive use of new elec-
tronic tools and information technologies, such as the Internet, e-mail, special 
radio and TV broadcasts via satellite, etc., enabled the emergence of a “virtual 
transnational national community.”
N O T E S
        Danforth, Loring M. The Macedonian Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, . .
        Cohen, Robin. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: UCL Press, . 
-.
        Seton-Watson, Hugh. Nations and States. London: Basil Blackwell, .
        Arjun Appadurai, cited in Danforth, -.
       See Benedict Anderson, Long Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the 
Rise of Identity Politics (Berkely: Center for German and European Studies, ) 
and Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, ).
       Danforth .
        According to the  census, there were ,, inhabitants in Croatia (State 
Bureau of Statistics).
        “The CFU distributes its bulletin Zajedničar (Fraternalist) free of charge to 
over , addresses in North America.” Open letter to the friends and alumni of 
the University of Zagreb, Fraternalist, September , : .
         For example, there is an article on the th birthday anniversary of Dr. Ante 
Starčević in the Fraternalist, June , : .
       The th commemoration of Katarina Zrinski's death, June , : .
      Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. London: Penguin Books, .
       Bleiburg is the place near the Austrian-Slovenian border where the Ustashi 
army that surrendered to the Western Allies in May  were passed back to Tito’s 
partisans and slaughtered. During the Socialist period, mention of this event was 
forbidden. 
      Another widely discussed issue was the exact number of people murdered by 
the Ustashi in the Jasenovac concentration camp during World War II, see Tomislav 
Sabljak, “Žrtve drugog svjetskog rata” (Victims of World War II), Fraternalist, 
August , : .
      The Croatian Spring was the liberal movement in Croatia during -. It 
was led by Croatian Communist Party functionaries and broken up in  when 
many involved were imprisoned for the threat they posed to the Yugoslav federation. 
See Vinko Grubišić, “Hrvatsko proljeće: dvadesetak godina kasnije” (The Croatian 
Spring: Twenty Years Later), Fraternalist, November , : -. The monument 
is a historical symbol of the Croatian struggle for freedom in the th century. It 
was finally returned to the main square in Zagreb on May , . Initially the 
horseman’s sword pointed north symbolizing Croatian resistance to Hungary and 
spaces of identity /
Austria, while today it points south. See “Spomenik banu Jelačiću”, (The Ban Jelacic 
Monument), Fraternalist, October , : .
      “The dutiful and necessary response of all people of Croatian descent is to reply 
‘Croatian,’ in order to identify oneself as a proud descendent of Croatian lineage” 
(“American Croatians to Fill In  Census,” Fraternalist, July , : ).
      “Report,” Fraternalist, April , : .
      “…plans are for public discussions on this subject and there is a proposal that 
the official language be “Croatian and Serbian. … Only for the Republic of Croatia 
is there a proposal for an official dual language, so if such a proposal is good for 
Croatia, why isn't it also proposed for all the other Republics of Yugoslavia?” (“About 
Our Society That Cares,” Fraternalist, December, : ). 
      “About Our Croatian Language,” Fraternalist, April , : .
      “Katedra Hrvatskog Jezika i Kulture” (The Department of Croatian Language 
and Culture), Fraternalist, March , : .
      “Croatian 'Voice' Needed,” Fraternalist, August , : .
      “Letter To The Editor,” Fraternalist, September , : .
      Voice of America - International Broadcasting Bureau http://www.voa.gov/
croatian/
      “Letter To The Editor,” Fraternalist, July , : .
      See case studies on this topic: Josip Kumpes, “Napomene o religiji, crkvi i 
etničkom identitetu (na primjeru Hrvata u Mađarskoj)” (Remarks on Religion and 
Ethnic Identity (The Case of Croats in Hungary), Migracijske teme   (Zagreb: ): 
-; and Mirjana Domini, “Gradišćanski Hrvati – zajedništvo usprkos granica 
(osvrt na sudbinu ogranka gradišćanskih Hrvata u Mađarskoj)” (The Gradisce Croats 
– Unity Despite Borders (Remarks on the Fate of the Gradisce Croat Branch in 
Hungary), Migracijske teme   (Zagreb: ): -.
      Prpic, George J. The Croatians in Greater Cleveland. Cleveland: . .
       “Posjet kard. Kuharića i msgr. Stankovića Hrvatima u dijaspori” (Cardinal 
Kuharic and Msgr. Stankovic Visit the Croatian Diaspora), Fraternalist, January , 
: , .
      “Iseljenički dan-..” (The Diaspora Day – ..), Fraternalist, 
January , : , .
      Fraternalist, February , : .
      Fraternalist, November , : .
      “Letter to the Editor,” Fraternalist, November , : .
      “Suradnja s Domovinom” (Cooperation with the Homeland), Fraternalist, 
September .
      “Open Letter to the Friends and Alumni of the University of Zagreb,” 
Fraternalist, September , : .
      ibid. .
      “Open Letter to the Friends and Alumni of the University of Zagreb,” 
Fraternalist, September , : .
      Tanner, Marcus. Croatia: A Nation Forged in War. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, . .
      ibid. .
      Fraternalist, January , . 
      For example, Ante Beljo’s article on Croat victims during World War II, 
Fraternalist, February , : , .
      “Editorial,” Fraternalist, January , : .
      This is revealed in the following quotation: “However, May  is remembered 
 spaces of identity /
in Croatia as the month of the terrible slaughter of imprisoned soldiers and civilians 
turned over to the Yugoslav Army by the Western Allies. Remembrance of this 
suffering is closely connected with Bleiburg and a forced death march referred to 
as ‘The Way of the Cross’… On the other hand, actions taken by the regime in 
Croatia, founded on an ideology of racial and national exclusivity, led to vengeance 
and indefensible acts that must be called crimes.” “Croatian Bishops Recall the End 
of the Second World War”, Fraternalist, May , : , .
      “...The Ustashi wanted only to liberate their country from the Serbian yoke and 
be independent, which they once were when they had their own kings etc. Their goal 
was separation from Yugoslavia. It can be compared to the struggle of the Basques 
in Spain or the Kurds in Turkey or the Armenians in Turkey or the Irish in Ulster. A 
nation without its independence is like a homeless person living in someone else’s 
home as a servant or slave” (“Letter to the Editor,” “A Brief Historical Review of the 
First  CFU Years,” Fraternalist, June , : ).
      “Pregled vijesti: Bratstvo i nacionalizam” (News Review: Brotherhood and 
Nationalism), Fraternalist, August , : .
      “Croatian solidarity – all for one and one for all – is our Croatian motto even 
more today than it ever was in the past. We are the sons of former Croatian do-
mobrans, partisans, Ustashi and who knows what other colors and camps  – we re-
spect them as our fathers, but adamantly refuse to repeat their suicidal fights no 
matter how much some individuals will be angry with us.” Ante Beljo, “Pisma” (Let-
ters), Fraternalist, October , : . Drazha Mihailovich was a Serbian Chetnick 
commander, and his troops rescued two American pilots that crashed in Yugoslavia 
during World War II. 
      “We Dare Not Honor Traitors,” Fraternalist, February , : -. 
      “Povampireno četništvo” (The Vampire-like Chetnicks), Fraternalist, January 
 and January , : ; and  “We Don't Want Any State of Yours,” Fraternalist, 
February , : .
       “Letter to the Editor,” Fraternalist, January , : .
      “A Brief Historical Review of the First  CFU Years,” Fraternalist, June , : 
.
      In Croatian – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ).
      “Pogledi i misli o Hrvatskoj” (Views and Thoughts on Croatia), Fraternalist, 
March , : .
      “Tudjman Plans Sovereign State,” Fraternalist, June , : .
      “Freedom and Democracy,” Fraternalist, February , : .
      “Pismo HDZ Saboru Hrvatske”, (The CDU's Letter to the Croatian Assembly), 
The Fraternalist,  December, . p. 
      “Tko može glasati na izborima u Hrvatskoj?” (Who Can Vote in the Elections 
in Croatia?), Fraternalist, March , : .
      Fraternalist, October , : .
      “A Brief Historical Review of the First  CFU Years,” Fraternalist, June , : 
.
      “President Luketich Interviewed By Voice of America,” Fraternalist, September 
, : .
      A fund-raising campaign in Los Angeles and San Pedro, CA to raise money to 
buy uniforms for Croatian soldiers raised , US. See Fraternalist, November 
, : .
      “We ask that you serve as witnesses and interpreters in your respective 
countries. … If you can, in any way, please influence the White House and Official 
spaces of identity /
Representatives of the US Government because the People of Europe are waiting 
to see what the BIG BROTHER has to say.” Ante Kločinović speech. “Minutes: th 
Quadrennial Convention Monday, September , ,” Fraternalist, January , . 
Another appeal, “Hrvatima u Sad i Kanadi” (To Croatians in the USA and Canada), 
was issued by the Croatian government urging the Croatian diaspora to inform their 
local, state and federal authorities about the situation in Croatia (Fraternalist, July 
, : ).
       “Zajedno do promocije Hrvatske” (Together for Croatian Promotion), 
Fraternalist, February , : .
      “Humanitarian Aid For Croatia,” Fraternalist, July , : .
      “... actually was started in May by members of a Croatian Youth Theater group 
“Marin Držić”, from Berlin, Germany...“ (“Humanitarian Aid,” Fraternalist, August , 
: .
      “Aid Fund Grows,” Fraternalist, September , : .
      “Glas Hrvata-kao jedan glas” (All Croats As One), Fraternalist, June , : 
.
      Fraternalist, July , . 
      Conversi, Daniele. “Moral Relativism and Equidistance.” This Time We Knew: 
Western Responses to War in Bosnia. Eds. Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Gabriel 
Mestrovic. New York: New York University Press, .
      Nenad Antonić, “E-mail Bridges The Ocean,” Fraternalist, March , : .
      “Direktno iz Zagreba: Slušajte dnevnu jednosatnu emisiju” (Direct from 
Croatia: Listen  hour Daily News Program), Fraternalist, September , : .
      Vladimir P. Goss, “Radio Zagreb Helps Create True Image of Croatia,” 
Fraternalist, December , : .
      “Fast and qualitative information from the homeland is of extreme importance 
for all Croatian emigrants who want to participate and contribute to Croatia's eco-
nomical prosperity.” Ante Beljo, “Projekt satelitske veze sa Hrvatskom” (The Satel-
lite Connection Project), Fraternalist, March , : .
      Milan N. Popp, “Letter to the Editor,” Fraternalist, August , : .
      “President’s Column – About Our Society That Cares,” Fraternalist, June , 
: .
       “Dijaspora iznad strančarenja” (Diaspora Beyond Partisan Quarrels), 
Fraternalist, September , : .
